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1 Introduction
While epistemologists have long debated what it takes for beliefs to be justified, they’ve
devoted much less collective attention to the question of what it takes for beliefs to
be excused, and how excuses differ from justifications.1 This stands in stark contrast
to the state of affairs in legal scholarship, where the contrast between justifications and
excuses is a standard topic in introductory criminal law textbooks.2 My overarching goal
in this paper is to extract some lessons from legal theory for epistemologists seeking to
distinguish epistemic justifications from epistemic excuses. But my aim in looking to the
law isn’t just to take advantage of a larger literature. Epistemologists often worry that
debates between proponents of different conceptions of epistemic justification threaten
to be “merely verbal”.3 This sort of worry is particularly pressing for epistemologists
who distinguish justifications from excuses. When all parties to a debate agree that a
belief has something to be said in defense of it, but differ over whether that something
For helpful comments and discussion, thanks to Gideon Yaffe, and audiences at the University of
Michigan, MIT, Oxford University, and Shandong University.
1Some notable recent exceptions include Boult (2017), Williamson (Forthcoming), Littlejohn (Forth-
coming), Schechter (Forthcoming), and Madison (Forthcoming).
2See, e.g., Robinson and Cahill (2012, Part IV), Allen (2015, Chapter 6), Dressler (2015, Chapter
17).
3See Alston (1993, 2005), Greco (2015), Cohen (2016), and Ballantyne (2016).
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amounts to a justification or a mere excuse, it’s natural to wonder just what turns on
that distinction. And it’s here that I intend to draw on legal scholarship; legal theorists
not only debate the question of how to classify defenses as justifications or excuses, but
also why it matters whether we classify a defense as a justification or an excuse—what
further downstream legal consequences (ought to) turn on the classification. So my aim
is to import from legal theory some tools for not only distinguishing justifications from
excuses, but also vindicating that distinction as substantive.
My strategy in the paper will be as follows. First, I’ll provide a brief overview of
appeals to the justification/excuse distinction in epistemology. As a preview, the dis-
tinction has been discussed largely in the context of the internalism/externalism debate,
and in recent years specifically in the context of debates about the “knowledge first”
program in epistemology. Internalists point to cases in which a subject has a belief that
seems justified, but which isn’t justified by externalist lights. Externalists respond that
the belief is merely excused, not justified. Internalists say that the belief looks impor-
tantly different from other putative cases of merely excused beliefs. Externalists admit
this, but hold that this merely shows that not all excuses are of the same kind. It’s at
this point that, absent some theory about what the justification/excuse distinction is for
and so why it matters where we draw the boundary, the debate threatens to be dead-
locked, and perhaps merely verbal. So I’ll look to legal theory to extract some potential
strategies for avoiding such a deadlock.
Unsurprisingly, legal theorists disagree about as much as epistemologists, so I won’t
try to import some settled, consensus doctrine. Rather, I’ll identify choice points in legal
theory for how to think about the function of the justification/excuse distinction, which
will motivate corresponding ways of drawing the boundary between justifications and
excuses, and will in turn correspond to analogous choice points in epistemology. I’ll argue
that by reference to certain legal principles, it’s possible to motivate a traditional, non-
factive, broadly internalist conception of epistemic justification, on which false beliefs
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can be fully justified and need no excuse. By reference to other legal principles, it’s
possible to motivate a factive conception of epistemic justification, on which only true
beliefs can be justified. But these principles will motivate a view where truth is all
that’s required for a belief to be justified—knowledge or reliability won’t come into the
picture, and so while the resulting picture is “externalist” in a sense, it fits awkwardly
with typical externalist projects in epistemology.
2 Justifications and Excuses in the Knowledge-First Pro-
gram
Consider the opening lines of the first chapter of Jonathan Sutton’s Without Justification:
My view is that a subject’s belief that p is justified if and only if he knows
that p: justification is knowledge. (2007, p. 7)
Sutton’s view faces an obvious objection, of which he is well aware: what about
subjects who seem to be doing everything right, reasoning exactly as they ought, and
who nevertheless form beliefs that don’t amount to knowledge? To raise this objection
against earlier forms of externalism—versions on which a justified belief must have been
produced by a generally reliable process, but needn’t be true—some outlandish cases
were required.4 But against Sutton’s view, it’s enough to imagine a cognitively normal
subject, call her Lara, in a largely normal environment—no demons or vats required—
confronted by a piece of wax fruit, let’s say a lemon. We may even suppose it’s in a bowl
of what is otherwise real fruit, and that Lara has already eaten a few genuine grapes.
If Lara believes that she is in the presence of a lemon, then her belief—so the objection
goes—is justified, despite not amounting to knowledge because false.
While Sutton himself doesn’t use the language of “excuse”—though he does talk
about these sorts of beliefs as “reasonable” and “blameless”—other knowledge firsters
4Most notably, the “New Evil Demon Problem”, raised by Stewart Cohen (1984).
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do. Here’s Timothy Williamson:
The brain in the vat’s belief that it has hands is unjustified: it does not
constitute knowledge, because it is false. What the brain in the vat has is a
cast-iron excuse for the belief, not a justification. (Forthcoming)
The more general picture defended by Williamson is that the most fundamental
norms for belief, action, assertion, and probably more, are properly characterized in
terms of knowledge. One shouldn’t believe, act on, or assert what one doesn’t know.
Justification is identified with successfully following these norms. So anyone who be-
lieves, acts on, or asserts what she does not know, fails to follow the relevant norm, and
is at best excused. Moreover, while the details of the explanation vary depending on
which knowledge-firster you ask, the existence of epistemic excuses is explained by their
bearing some relation to knowledge. Perhaps a belief that doesn’t amount to knowledge
is excusable when the subject reasonably thinks she knows,5 or isn’t in a position to
know that she doesn’t know,6 or is conducting her epistemic affairs as someone generally
disposed to acquire knowledge in normal circumstances would.7
A relatively standard internalist response at this point is to object that, in some
circumstances, forming a false belief is the right response to misleading evidence, and so
requires no excuse. Some representative examples:8
So rather than demon world victims having merely excusable beliefs, we have
reason to think that they have justified beliefs, since they are believing as
they should, or as they ought, since their beliefs are praiseworthy, rather
than the proper objects of criticism. (Madison, Forthcoming, p. 6)
Consider the case of an assertion in a Gettier-style case... or in the case of
5See DeRose (2002) and Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) for versions of this response. See Gerken
(2011) for a critical response.
6See Srinivasan (2015).
7See Aarnio (2010), Williamson (Forthcoming).
8See also Pryor (2001, pp.117) for a earlier version of this reply.
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a justified false belief...According to the excuse response, Jones’s assertion is
improper but Jones is blameless for asserting it, since Jones has an excuse.
The trouble is that it is not merely the case that Jones’s assertion is blameless.
Rather, Jones positively ought to make the assertion. When asked, he should
say that it is 2:05 pm. If Jones does not say that it is 2:05 pm (and has no
reason not to cooperate with his interlocutor), then he is criticizable for
not asserting what he believes about the time. That Jones has an excuse
for making the assertion, and is therefore blameless for so doing, does not
explain this fact. (Schechter, Forthcoming, p.21)
The thought, as I interpret it, is that to label reasonable false beliefs as merely ex-
cused is to damn them with faint praise; excused beliefs include beliefs you form because
you’re a child, or insane, or drugged. To lump the beliefs of people like Lara—beliefs that
are the product of impeccable reasoning—into such a category seems indiscriminating.
At this point, knowledge firsters have offered what I’ll call the “Anna Karenina
Response”. Justified beliefs are all alike—they are all knowledge—but each merely
excused belief is merely excused in its own way. That is, they’ll agree that, despite all
belonging to the category of “merely excused beliefs”, there are important differences
between false beliefs that are the product of proper cognitive functioning in an abnormal
or uncooperative environment, and beliefs that are the product of blamelessly impaired
cognitive functioning. But even granting that the former sorts of beliefs are in some
interesting sense epistemically better or more praiseworthy than the latter, that doesn’t
mean they’re justified. Williamson and Littlejohn both offer versions of this response:
Excuses are inexhaustibly various; one should not expect a neat taxonomy.
(Williamson, Forthcoming, fn. 7)
Excuses are a motley bunch. (Littlejohn, Forthcoming, p.10)9
9Littlejohn offering a characterization of Austin’s position, to which he is sympathetic.
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At this point I want to step back and offer a very general characterization of what
I take to be the common ground in the debate, with an eye towards motivating the
worry that it’s not entirely clear what substantive point is at issue. Both sides can
agree that false beliefs are “somehow defective” (Williamson, Forthcoming, p.24), and
that knowledge amounts to a kind of success; when the belief-forming process goes well,
as it ideally should—in some sense of “should”, at least—the belief thereby formed
will amount to knowledge. Both sides also agree that in some cases of “unsuccessful”
belief—i.e., belief that doesn’t amount to knowledge—the failure to “succeed” does not
reflect poorly in any sense on the believer, and in fact it would have reflected poorly
on the believer if she had believed anything else; e.g., it would reflect poorly on Lara
if she believed she was looking at a wax lemon, or even if she just suspended judgment
on whether the lemon in front of her was wax or genuine. And both sides can also
agree that some cases of unsuccessful belief reflect poorly in some sense on the believer,
but in which we nevertheless wouldn’t blame the believer in any thick sense of “blame”.
Consider the delusional beliefs that are sometimes the product of Parkinson’s disease. As
I understand the debate, all parties can agree that these beliefs are interestingly different,
from an epistemic point of view, from Lara’s. While blameless—I take it that nobody
is blameworthy for developing Parkinson’s disease, or for the ensuing symptoms—they
are not the product of rational thought processes, the way Lara’s belief is.
That’s a lot of agreement—so what’s the dispute? It can look as if all parties ac-
knowledge the same set of theoretically significant distinctions among beliefs, and merely
differ over how we should label those distinctions; knowledge firsters only honor success-
ful beliefs with the label “justified”, and while they recognize a theoretically significant
distinction between beliefs like Lara’s, and delusional beliefs, they class both sorts as
merely excused. Their opponents also recognize a significant distinction between suc-
cessful beliefs and Lara’s—they needn’t be knowledge eliminativists—but nevertheless
apply the label “justified” to both. Following Chalmers (2011), I think a helpful way to
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frame the question of just what this difference could amount to is to ask what theoretical
role we want the label “justified” to play—what further commitments do we take on by
classifying a belief as justified, as opposed to merely excused?
It’s here that I’ll ultimately turn to legal theory for some inspiration, but before
doing so, I’ll briefly discuss one potential theoretical role for the label “justified” that I
find already present in the epistemological literature. We might propose that the role
of “justified” in epistemology is to mark the theoretically most fundamental distinction
for the evaluation of beliefs—the distinction in terms of which all other epistemological
distinctions are to be explained.10 In that case, if the knowledge firster is right that we
can explain the significance of the various distinctions the internalist emphasizes—e.g.,
the distinction between beliefs like Lara’s, and those of blamelessly deluded subjects—in
terms of knowledge, then that’s a point in her favor.
But, as a sociological matter at least, the idea that the role of “justified” in episte-
mology is to mark the most theoretically fundamental distinction for the evaluation of
beliefs would be highly revisionary. In both epistemology and ethics, it’s standard to
distinguish values from norms, and to defend positions on which some fundamental value
that is not itself a norm plays a key role in grounding norms. Rule utilitarians hold that
the distinction between the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain is the theoretically
most fundamental distinction in ethics—all other ethical distinctions, such as the distinc-
tion between right and wrong action, are explained by appeal to that distinction. But
they do not hold that the normative standard for action appeals directly to that value;
this is what distinguishes them from act utilitarians. Rather, the relationship between
the distinction between pleasure and pain on the one hand, and the distinction between
right and wrong action on the other, is indirect—actions are justified insofar as they
conform to the right rules, whose rightness is constituted by some relation they bear to
10This is suggested, I think, by some remarks of Williamson’s where he defends the identification of
justification with knowledge by pointing to the unifying power of an approach with knowledge norms at
the foundation. See (Williamson, Forthcoming, p.24).
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the distinction between pleasure and pain.11 Traditional reliabilists hold a closely anal-
ogous position in epistemology. They hold that the distinction between the value of true
belief and the disvalue of false belief is the most fundamental theoretical distinction in
epistemology. Other distinctions, such as the distinction between justified and unjusti-
fied belief, are to be explained by appeal to that distinction. But again, they don’t hold
that the beliefs are justified just in case they manifest that fundamental value—they
don’t say that beliefs are justified just in case they are true. Rather, they hold that the
relationship between the value of truth and the justification of belief is indirect; beliefs
are justified when they are caused by the right processes, whose rightness is constituted
by some relation they bear to the distinction between truth and falsity.12 The more
recent “accuracy first” program in formal epistemology is similar; its proponents treat
the value of accuracy in credence—closeness to the truth—as fundamental. But they
don’t say that credences are more justified to the extent that they are closer to the truth.
Rather, the norms on credence they do discuss are defended indirectly; credences are
justified just in case they conform to certain norms—probabilism, conditionalization, the
principal principle—that are themselves vindicated by appeal to the value of accuracy.13
The point of all these examples is to show that it’s routinely presupposed that the
distinction between justified and unjustified actions, beliefs, and/or credences may not be
theoretically fundamental, but instead explained by some more fundamental distinction,
perhaps concerning some species of value. So if the knowledge firster defends the view
that we should identify the knowledge/ignorance distinction with the distinction between
justified and unjustified belief on the grounds that the distinction between knowledge
and ignorance is the theoretically most fundamental distinction in epistemology, she
risks talking past her opponent; her opponent might well be happy to grant that the
distinction she identifies as the distinction between justified and unjustified belief is not
11See Brandt (1959) for a classic statement.
12See Goldman (1979).
13See, e.g., Joyce (1998), Pettigrew (2016).
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theoretically fundamental—perhaps it is somehow derived from the value of truth, as
even many internalists accept.14 So if we want to maintain the prospect of a substantive
dispute about whether subjects like Lara have justified or merely excused beliefs, we
should look for some other theoretical role for the label “justified” besides that of marking
whatever property of beliefs is most fundamental in epistemology.
My strategy in the rest of the paper will be to look to legal theory for some roles
we might want justification, as distinct from excuse, to play. As a preview, classifying a
defense as a justification rather than an excuse matters because there are further legal
consequences, beyond mere immunity to punishment, that distinguish justifications from
excuses. I’ll provisionally assume a tight connection between justifying/excusing actions,
and justifying/excusing beliefs: actions essentially based on justified (merely excused)
beliefs are themselves justified (merely excused). This will allow me to neatly connect
choice points in legal theory with choice points in epistemology, by allowing me to draw
conclusions about the when beliefs are justified/excused, given premises about when
actions are justified/excused. Later, I’ll relax that assumption, and explore whether
we might vindicate an epistemological distinction between justified and excused beliefs
that is merely analogous to the legal distinction between justified and excused actions—
this will require looking for epistemological analogs of the downstream legal consequences
that distinguish justification from excuses. While I won’t attempt to stake out and defend
a position on how best to distinguish epistemic justifications from epistemic excuses, I
will argue that my discussion provides some reason for pessimism about knowledge first
approaches to that project.
14See, e.g., BonJour (1985, Chapter 8).
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3 Justifications and Excuses in the Law
Before discussing how justifications and excuses differ, it’s worth pausing to note some
crucial features they have in common. The most obvious is that they both shield their
bearers from retributive punishment. If my defense fully succeeds, then whether it’s a
justification or an excuse, I’m not going to jail. Perhaps less obviously, both justifica-
tions and excuses are “affirmative defenses”. A defendant who offers a justification or an
excuse responds to an accusation not with “no”, but instead with “yes, but...”15 This
points to a potentially significant structural difference between both justifications and
excuses in the law, and the notion of justification as it is used epistemology. Epistemol-
ogists are typically happy to ask of any belief some subject has, whether it is justified.
Or even more broadly, of any proposition, believed or not, whether some subject has
justification to believe that proposition.16 In the law, however, questions of justifica-
tion and excuse only arise after it’s been conceded that someone violated some prima
facie norm. We can ask whether particular acts of theft or battery might be justified, ex-
cused, or neither, but to ask such questions concerning an everyday instance of sandwich
consumption would be to commit a kind of category mistake.
What might an analogous conception of epistemic justification/excuse look like? Ask-
ing whether some belief was justified, merely excused, or neither would involve presup-
posing that it violated some prima facie norm. Perhaps questions of justification and
excuse would only arise for beliefs that turned out to be false, or for beliefs in prima
facie absurdities—“You think you were abducted by aliens? What’s your justification for
that?”17 To conceive of epistemic justification along these lines would be quite different
from present practice, and I won’t try to explore the prospects for taking seriously the
15In this respect, justifications and excuses are more like defenses that appeal to statutes of limitations,
and less like alibis.
16This distinction between doxastic and propositional justification was originally drawn by Firth
(1978).
17So, far from factive conceptions of justification, we might end up with an anti-factive conception—
one on which only false beliefs can be justified.
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idea of justification as an affirmative defense—i.e., as a response to some conceded prima
facie wrongdoing.
So much for their similarities—what about their differences? There are two main
dimensions along which we might ask how justifications and excuses differ. First, we
might ask how the conditions for having a justification differ from those for having
an excuse. Second, we might ask how the consequences of having a justification differ
from those of having an excuse. And of course, these questions will not be entirely
independent—our views about what it takes to justify or excuse action should be sensitive
to what commitments we take on in regarding an action as justified or excused.
My strategy in this section will be as follows. First, I’ll give a few examples of
paradigm justifications and paradigm excuses—i.e., paradigm types of justifying and ex-
cusing conditions. Then, I’ll discuss a key disputed case, known as “reasonable mistake
of fact.”18 While it is uncontroversially some type of affirmative defense, legal systems
differ in whether they classify it together with paradigm justifications or paradigm ex-
cuses (and it is controversial among legal theorists how it should be classified). Here,
I’ll suggest that how we should classify it depends what role the justification/excuse dis-
tinction should play—how the consequences of having a justification should differ from
those of having an excuse. I’ll explore two common conceptions of this role—conceptions
that are consistent in most cases, but which pull in opposite directions when it comes to
reasonable mistake of fact. Relying on the provisional assumption that justified beliefs
justify action, while merely excused beliefs will merely excuse action, I’ll argue that de-
pending on which conception of the role of the justification/excuse distinction we adopt,
we can either vindicate a traditional epistemological internalist conception of justifica-
tion, or a purely factive conception of justification on which justification requires only
truth, but that neither of the main conceptions are congenial to the view that epistemic
justification requires knowledge.
18The implied contrast intended by the qualifier of fact is typically of law—in most jurisdictions,
under most circumstances, ignorance of the law is not treated as exculpatory.
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3.1 Paradigm Justifications and Excuses
While it’s probably impossible to offer any uncontroversial general characterization of
the distinction between justifications and excuses, a common initial gloss runs as fol-
lows: justifications pertain to the act, excuses to the actor.19 Justifying an act involves
showing that, though it was of a type whose instances are typically wrong, given the
totality of circumstances, it was the right thing to do after all. Excusing an act involves
conceding that it was wrong, but arguing that, for some reason, the actor cannot be
held responsible for it. Classic justifications include self-defense, necessity, and various
species of authority. Normally, intentional homicide is a crime, as is destroying someone
else’s property, or breaking and entering. But if the reason I intentionally kill someone
is because it’s the only way to prevent that person from unlawfully killing me, then
my act is justified by self-defense. If the reason I smash someone’s car window is that
doing so is the only way to save an infant in the car from heat stroke, then though I’ve
damaged someone’s property, my act is justified by necessity. And if the reason I break
into and enter someone’s home is that I’m a firefighter responding to an emergency call,
my action is justified by authority.20
Classic excuses involve insanity, involuntary intoxication, and duress. Battery, vehic-
ular manslaughter, and abetting robbery are typically punishable by prison sentences.
But if the reason I hit you is that the voices in my head commanded me to, my act of
battery may be excused. If the reason I crashed my car into yours is that I was invol-
untarily intoxicated—someone spiked my seltzer, perhaps—then my vehicular homicide
may be excused. And if the reason I drove the getaway car for a bank robbery is that
19As Fletcher (1985) puts it, “Claims of justification concern the rightness, or at least the legal
permissibility, of an act that nominally violates the law...Excuses speak not to the rightness or desirability
of the act but to the personal culpability of the actor. (p. 954). Though even this much is controversial.
Baron (2007) objects to this characterization of the distinction: “I do not think it generally important
to draw a sharp distinction between appraisals of actions and appraisals of agents. It is an undercurrent
of both this paper and some of my other work that it is often better to blur them, speaking in terms of
the agent’s conduct and thus about both action and character...” (emphasis in original).
20Other species of authority include law enforcement authority and parental authority, both of which
can justify conduct that would otherwise be criminal.
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the person in the passenger seat had a gun to my head, I’ll probably be excused.
The defenses I’ve been discussing so far are, by and large, uncontroversially classifi-
able either as justifications or as excuses.21 But the case I’ll focus on, and which is of
most relevance to epistemological debates—reasonable mistake of fact—is trickier. To
imagine a situation in which a reasonable mistake of fact defense would be appropriate,
start with a case in which a justification would be straightforwardly applicable. Now,
modify the case so that, while the subject reasonably believes the situation to be one in
which a justification is straightforwardly applicable, she is reasonably mistaken about
the facts. This can be done with any justification.
For example, start with a case of self-defense or defense of others, but now modify
the case so that, in fact, no genuine threat is present. Perhaps the would-be attacker is
a method actor preparing for a role as a murderer. He is brandishing an unloaded gun,
and has no intention of committing any actual violence. But the person who tackles him
has no reason to suspect this. We could similarly modify the case of necessity so that it is
just an extremely lifelike doll in the hot car, and so no destruction of property is actually
necessary to preserve any infant’s life. And we could modify the case of authority so
that the address is reported incorrectly, and the house the firefighter breaks into was not
the subject of any emergency call.
In each of these cases, we have a subject who performs some action that, were she
better informed, would uncontroversially amount to an unjustified, inexcusable crime.
But given that she’s not better informed, and that her mistake is reasonable—cases
of unreasonable mistake of fact are importantly different from the cases under present
discussion22—should we classify her defense as a justification, or a mere excuse?
Before addressing this question, I want to say a bit about why I think it’s potentially
21Duress is the trickiest case. While typically labeled an excuse, in at least some cases, it can look
more like a justification. See Greenawalt (1986) for some helpful discussion.
22This isn’t to say that unreasonable mistakes of fact are legally unimportant or interesting. Even an
unreasonable mistake of fact can often serve as a (non-affirmative) defense by negating mens rea. See
Dubber (2015, p. 83).
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of so much relevance to epistemologists. The notion of “reasonableness” in the common
law tradition, while intentionally vague, flexible, and subject to jury interpretation,23
can look a lot like justification as conceived of by the internalist. It’s not a factive notion;
reasonable mistakes are possible. But it’s also not completely subjective—not all sin-
cerely held beliefs count as reasonable. In these respects, it resembles typical internalist
conceptions of epistemic justification. Moreover, paradigm examples of the reasonable
mistake of fact defense look like cases in which the beliefs the subject acts on are justified
by internalist lights, but at best excused by the lights of the knowledge-first theorist.
So the debate over how to classify the reasonable mistake of fact defense looks a lot like
an action-focused analog of the debate between knowledge-firsters and their opponents
surveyed in §2. And if we accept the pair of principles mentioned earlier in the paper—
that actions essentially based on justified beliefs are themselves justified, while actions
essentially based on merely excused beliefs are merely excused—then taking a position
on whether actions based on reasonable mistakes—read: actions based on internalisti-
cally justified but nevertheless not knowledgable beliefs—are justified or merely excused
will commit us to a position on whether the mistaken beliefs themselves are justified or
merely excused.
So why is it that theorists—and legal systems—have been drawn in opposing direc-
tions when it comes to the reasonable mistake fact defense? In brief, in some respects
it resembles paradigm excuses, while in others it resembles paradigm justifications. On
the excuse side, cases of reasonable mistake of fact are cases in which somebody takes
an act that, from a point of view of an omniscient observer, is regrettable. But on the
justification side, actors who make reasonable mistakes of fact don’t exhibit the sorts of
diminished capacity that paradigmatically excused actors do.
It’s uncontroversial that the actors in the cases I’ve imagined should not be subject
to punishment. So if we’re to make sense of the question of whether these defenses
23See, e.g., Fletcher (1985, p.953).
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should be classed as justifications or excuses, we need some further explanation of what
role the classification plays, beyond shielding an actor from punishment.24 It’s to some
potential such explanations that I’ll now turn.
3.2 Downstream Consequences of Justifications and Excuses
The two main proposed functional differences between justifications and excuses that
I’ll focus on are as follows. First, I’ll discuss the idea that justifications should shield
their bearers from a wider variety of negative consequences than excuses. Second, I’ll
discuss the idea that whether an actor is justified or merely excused has implications
for third parties—whether they can be held liable as accomplices to the actor’s conduct,
whether they are permitted to aid or hinder that conduct, and the like. While these two
ideas are consistent in their application to most defenses—we can uphold both of them
while agreeing that, e.g., self-defense is a justification and insanity is an excuse—I’ll
argue that they pull us in different directions when it comes to classifying the reasonable
mistake of fact defense; we’re forced to choose between them, and depending on which we
prioritize we’ll classify the defense differently. While these aren’t the only two ways legal
theorists have proposed to functionally distinguish between justifications and excuses,
the others are unlikely to have any upshots for the classification of reasonable mistake of
fact defense, and so are unlikely to shed light on debates about justification and excuse
in epistemology, so I relegate discussion of them to a footnote.25
24As Greenawalt (1986) puts it:
If the exclusive purpose of criminal law were to allocate an appropriate amount of pun-
ishment to those accused of doing wrong, the law would not need to distinguish between
justifications and excuses. (p. 90)
25Other functional differences concern burdens of proof, and the retroactive applicability of changes
in the classification of defenses (both of which are discussed in Dressler 2015, Chapter 17). With respect
to the former, the general idea is that it ought to be harder for the state to shift the burden of proof to
the defendant if the defendant is alleging that her conduct was justified, as opposed to merely excused.
With respect to the latter, the issue concerns cases in which an actor’s conduct is covered by some
defense at time t1, but she is then tried at t2 after which the law has changed such that her conduct
would not be covered by the new version (if any) of the defense. The thought is that which regime
she should be tried under depends on whether the defense was a justification or an excuse; if it was a
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3.3 Non-Punitive Sanctions
Perhaps the most direct way in which the justification/excuse distinction can be legally
consequential is in determining just what happens to the accused when the trial is over.
Morse (1998, p.334) puts it nicely:
...[T]he characterization of a defense as a justification or as an excuse may
substantially alter the outcome: a justified defendant is properly and entirely
freed as well as acquitted; an excused defendant who may continue to be a
nonresponsible agent and a danger to society may be subject to civil or
quasi-criminal interference with her liberty.
This distinction is easiest to see with excuses like insanity. A successful insanity
defense against a criminal charge will typically not lead to the defendant’s walking away
free, and in many cases may lead to a longer period of incarceration—albeit of a different,
putatively non-punitive sort—than would conviction in the absence of such a defense.
(Elliott et al., 1993) By contrast, a justification for a criminal charge will shield its bearer
both from prison, and from commitment to a psychiatric institution.
To take a less dramatic example, imagine someone is charged with vehicular homicide—
a crime punishable by an extensive prison sentence—and consider two ways she might
defend herself. First, she might offer the excuse that she is epileptic, and had a seizure
that led her to lose control of her vehicle, swerving into a pedestrian. Given the right
background conditions—e.g., she didn’t have prior knowledge of the condition, and had
no reason to expect that she couldn’t safely operate a motor vehicle—such an excuse
justification, then the actor was permitted to rely on it as a rule of conduct, and so can appeal to the
law as it was at t1 to justify her action; imagine a case in which a statute defining self-defense initially
lacks a proportionality requirement, and one is later added. Under this theory, because self-defense is
a justification, an actor who defends herself using force that would be disproportionate to the threat
by the lights of the law as it stands at t2, can nevertheless appeal to the law as of t1 to justify her
conduct. By contrast, if it was an excuse that was changed—perhaps a stricter definition of insanity was
adopted—an actor would not be entitled to defend herself by arguing that she would have qualified for
an excuse under the t1 law.
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should save her from jail. But she’ll probably still lose her driver’s license.26
By contrast, if she can justify her act—suppose she uncovers CCTV footage showing
that five children jumped into the road immediately in front of her vehicle, which lets
her make the case that swerving into the one pedestrian was the only way to avoid killing
the five—then not only will she avoid jail, but she’ll keep her license too.
More generally, the idea is that justifications are principled barriers to (almost) any
penalty, while excuses are barriers only to punishment.27 Insofar as preventive detention
in a mental institution or the forfeiture of one’s driver’s license aren’t understood as
punishments, they aren’t in principle off the table as consequences for a merely excused
actor. Of course, that’s not to say that whenever an actor is merely excused, she will
or should suffer some non-punitive sanction; in many, perhaps most cases of excuse, no
such sanctions are called for. Rather, it’s to say that excuses don’t provide principled
barriers to such sanctions, while justifications do.
This proposal for how to functionally distinguish justifications from excuses—how
their consequences differ—fits more neatly with some views about what it takes to have
a justification (or an excuse) than others. In particular, it fits neatly with views on
which showing that an actor conducted herself ideally—as well as could be expected of
anyone in her circumstances—is enough to justify that act. By contrast, on such views,
excusing an act will involve conceding that the actor’s conduct was less than ideal, but
nevertheless blameless. Marcia Baron (2007, p.399) puts the distinction as follows:
...to most of us, I think, it does indeed matter whether we are told, “We
won’t blame you; we understand that it would be too much to ask you to do
better than you did”; or instead, “We won’t blame you; for heaven’s sake,
26See https://www.epilepsy.com/driving-laws for some information on how the relevant laws vary
from state to state in the US.
27The “almost” is crucial. Famously, people who act with the justification of “private necessity”—
roughly, like regular necessity, but where the beneficiary of the necessary action is the actor—are still
civilly liable for damages their justified actions cause. The classic case illustrating this principle is
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., decided by the Supreme court of Minnesota in 1910.
17
Justifications and Excuses in Epistemology
you conducted yourself in a way that was exemplary.”
As I interpret it, Baron’s point is that excused actors manifest some defect—albeit a
blameless one—while justified actors manifest no defect at all. This is why we generally
prefer to be justified than excused. This idea fits neatly with the present proposal
for functionally distinguishing justifications from excuses. If excused actors manifest a
defect, then, depending on the nature of that defect, it may make sense for them to
be treated differently from other actors who have no such defect—e.g., restricting their
freedom of movement, or their driving privileges—even though it won’t be appropriate
to punish them (because the defect is not one for which they are to blame). And by the
same token, because justified actors manifest no defect, there’s no reason for them to
suffer any loss of rights or privileges that they had prior to trial.
Supposing we prioritize this way of functionally distinguishing justifications from
excuses, it’s extremely natural to classify reasonable mistake of fact as a justification,
rather than an excuse. In paradigm cases of the defense, the conduct of an actor reason-
ably mistaken about the facts manifests no defect, and a fortiori no defect that could
justify non-punitive sanctions. In fact, in many cases, had the actor acted in the way
that would’ve been best given the actual facts, rather than the facts as she reasonably
believed them to be, she would have manifested a defect. Hamish Stewart (2003) dis-
cusses a case in which a law enforcement officer shoots a suspect, believing the suspect
was about to shoot his partner. As it turns out, the suspect’s gun was unloaded. Had
the law enforcement officer known the gun was unloaded, he wouldn’t have shot the
suspect, since he could’ve been safely subdued with less force. But given his evidence,
it would have been a dereliction of his duty to his partner not to shoot the suspect.28
Some kind of sanction—perhaps desk duty—would be appropriate in the case where the
officer fails to shoot the suspect, but not in the case where he shoots the suspect on the
28Stewart’s argument, in defense of classifying reasonable mistake of fact as a justification, strikes me
as strongly reminiscent of the internalist epistemological arguments from Madison and Schechter quoted
earlier in this essay.
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basis of a reasonably mistaken belief about whether the gun was a genuine threat.
Given the earlier assumption that justified beliefs justify actions, while merely ex-
cused beliefs will merely excuse actions, adopting this conception of the functional role
of justification, along with the view that reasonable mistake of fact should be classified
as a justification, will push us towards an epistemological view on which beliefs needn’t
be true in order to be justified.
Of course, there are difficult, intermediate cases—cases where someone acts on a
mistaken belief that is neither obviously reasonable, nor obviously not. One can consis-
tently adopt the conception of the functional role of the justification/excuse distinction
I’ve been discussing in this section, while thinking that some mistake of fact defenses
ought to be thought of as excuses, on the grounds that the mistaken belief on the basis
of which the accused acts does manifest a defect, albeit a blameless one. Perhaps a
case where a law enforcement officer shoots someone who’s not even carrying a gun, but
merely something that looks a bit like a gun, would be such a case; there we might think
that ideal conduct wouldn’t have led to a decision to shoot, but, depending on how easy
a mistake it is to make, the officer might be excused for making it. But since he is
merely excused, some kind of modification in his status might be appropriate; perhaps
he should still be relegated to desk duty.
It will be difficult to decide, on a case by case basis, where to draw the boundaries
between reasonable beliefs that justify actions, less than fully reasonable but nevertheless
blameless beliefs that merely excuse them, partially blameworthy beliefs that mitigate
wrongdoing, and wholly inexcusable beliefs that merely explain, without excusing or jus-
tifying, the actions based on them. But what’s clear is that, given the present conception
of the functional role of the justification/excuse distinction, the boundary between a jus-
tified belief and a merely excused one shouldn’t depend on whether the belief is true.
In some circumstances, an agent who is conducting her epistemic and practical affairs
in ideal, exemplary fashion will nevertheless end up with a false belief. If she acts on
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that belief, she should have a principled shield against any sanctions—punitive or non-
punitive—because in doing so she has not manifested any defect, blameworthy or not,
that the legal system can legitimately concern itself with. And if the crucial functional
role of justification, as distinct from excuse, is that it provides such a shield, then we
should regard such agents as acting justifiably. If we also we hold that actions essentially
based on merely excused beliefs cannot be justified, then once we regard such agents as
acting justifiably, we’re committed to holding that the false but reasonable beliefs they
act on are themselves not merely excused, but justified. That is, we must come down
on the internalist side of the debate surveyed in §2.
3.4 Justification and Third Parties
Perhaps the most common proposal for what functionally distinguishes justifications
from excuses concerns their differential consequences for third parties. If I’m justified in
my action, then not only should I not be punished, but others shouldn’t be punished for
aiding or abetting me. By contrast, if I’m merely excused, then while I will escape pun-
ishment, my accomplices will not. As Chiesa (2014, p.330) summarizes, “justifications
transfer to third parties, whereas excuses are personal to the actor.”
Like the principle discussed in the previous section, this principle fits neatly with
paradigm cases of justification and excuse. If I’m justifiably defending myself against an
unjust aggressor, then not only should I escape punishment, but third parties shouldn’t
be punished for aiding me, nor should they hinder me in using force against my attacker.
Along similar lines, if I’m trying and failing to break the window of car in which an infant
is suffering heat stroke, third parties would do right in aiding me—perhaps by providing
me with something heavy to use to break the glass. By contrast, if I’m suffering from
a violent psychotic episode, while I may be excused for harm I cause, third parties
shouldn’t be punished for restraining me, and would be rightly subject to punishment
if, instead, they provided me with firearms. They can’t take advantage of my excuse.
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Similarly, if I’ve been involuntarily intoxicated, while I might have an excuse for harm
I cause, a third party who understands the situation would have no excuse for handing
me my car keys and wishing me a pleasant journey.
Unlike the principle in the previous section, the principle that justifications transfer
to third parties most naturally fits with classifying reasonable mistake of fact as a mere
excuse, rather than a justification. The reason is that if I, as a third party, understand
that somebody is acting on the basis of a mistake, then even if she manifests no defect—
even if her mistake really is fully reasonable—I shouldn’t aid her, and should hinder her
if I can. For example, if I know that it’s just a highly lifelike doll in the car, then I
shouldn’t hand a hammer to the would-be hero trying to break the window. But if we
regard that reasonably mistaken person as justified in breaking the window, and we hold
that justifications transfer to third parties, then we get the absurd conclusion—absurd
no matter where we draw the boundary between justification and excuse—that I would
be justified in giving her a hammer.29
Suppose we want to vindicate in full generality the third party transfer princi-
ple. What view about justified belief—assuming that justified beliefs justify actions—
naturally follows? Another way to put it—what property must a belief have in order for
actions based on that belief to be thereby justified? As we’ve just seen, it’s clear that
reasonableness won’t suffice; reasonableness is compatible with mistake, and we don’t
want actions essentially based on mistakes to be aided. But it’s just as easy to see that
knowledge isn’t required. As long as your belief that there’s an infant in the car suffering
heatstroke is true, then we want third parties to aid you in taking actions based on that
belief, even if the belief doesn’t amount to knowledge. In fact, as the example I’m about
to discuss will bring out, vindicating the third-party transfer principle leads most natu-
rally to a view where whether an act is justified doesn’t really depend on the quality of
29Legal theorists who argue for classifying reasonable mistake of fact as a justification are aware of
this problem, and will typically just deny that the third-party transfer principle holds in full generality.
See, e.g., Baron (2007, p.404).
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the actor’s beliefs at all, but only on the facts themselves. That is, so long as there exist
facts sufficient to justify some action, then we hope third parties will aid and not hinder
the actor, regardless of whether he himself acts on the basis of beliefs—knowledgeable
or not—concerning these facts.
Paul Robinson (1998) describes a real-life case that nicely brings out this point:
Motti Ashkenazi, a thin, almost gaunt-looking man from a poor, crime-ridden
South Tel Aviv neighborhood, is strolling along a crowded Jerusalem beach
between Tel Aviv and Jaffa on a hot Friday afternoon in June 1997. A drug
addict and petty thief who only a week ago had been arrested after bungling
a car burglary, Ashkenazi has been thinking for a while about getting off
drugs and putting his life together. But the going has been tough even with
the support of his family.
As he walks, he sees that someone has left a black backpack unattended in an
open area by the sidewalk. The 30-year-old Askhenazi looks around but sees
no one watching. He picks up the backpack and quietly sneaks off, pleased by
his good fortune. Without opening the backpack to inspect his loot, he walks
down nearby Guela street to a rundown apartment building and slips inside.
There in the stairwell, he unzips the backpack. Inside he sees a clock with
wires connected to a cookie tin, with loose nails surrounding the contraption.
Ashkenazi quickly realizes he just stole a bomb. (p. 388)
Motti committed theft—he took someone else’s property without permission. More-
over, his conduct was far from laudable. Even so, we should want third parties with an
accurate view of the situation to aid people in his situation. If somebody were to see
that Motti was having a hard time carrying the bag away from the crowded beach, we’d
want the law to encourage giving him a hand. Even if he doesn’t know it—doesn’t even
believe it—if the third-party transfer principle is our guide, then Motti’s thievery must
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be ruled justified, as he should be helped rather than hindered.
That is, vindicating the third-party transfer principle will push us towards what is
sometimes called an “objectivist” or “deeds”-based approach to justification, on which
whether an act is justified depends not on the mental state of the actor, but on the
objective facts of the situation.30 So strictly speaking it’s probably best to interpret
such a view as severing any interesting connection between the justification of belief,
and the justification of action; even with an “objectivist” view of epistemic justification,
on which it just amounts to truth, the view under consideration does not entail that
justified actions must be based on justified beliefs. After all, Motti’s action was crucially
based on the false belief that the bag he was carrying didn’t contain a bomb. But if
we must extract a view about justified belief from this view about the justification of
action, then the view that justification just amounts to truth is the natural candidate.
While not necessary, being based on true beliefs is a kind of minimal sufficient condi-
tion for an action to be justified, given the view under consideration.31 That is, we can
distinguish views about what’s required for justification by their answer to the following
question. If you’re acting in the way that, were your beliefs true, then your action would
be for the best, what feature of your beliefs would guarantee that your action is justified?
The view about justification we saw in the previous section would answer: reasonable-
ness. (Where, again, the notion of reasonableness at issue is non-factive; it allows for
reasonable mistakes.) If your beliefs are reasonable, and you’re acting such that, if your
beliefs were true then your action would be for the best, then your action is justified.
The knowledge-first view says: knowledge. That is, even if you’re doing what is best
in light of the actual facts, if you’re acting on the basis of beliefs that don’t amount
to knowledge, then your action isn’t justified. The view motivated by the third-party
30This is the view Robinson (1998), who describes the case, favors. It is also the view enshrined in
Israeli law; Motti walked free.
31This isn’t quite right, since clear-eyed wrongdoing is possible—actors can do wrong on the basis
of true beliefs. So the “based on” in the sentence in the text should really be interpreted as “properly
based on”, in the sense that an action is properly based on some beliefs just in case, were the beliefs
true, the action really would be for the best.
23
Justifications and Excuses in Epistemology
transfer principle imposes weaker requirements than the knowledge-first view. If you’re
doing what would be best if your beliefs were true, and your beliefs are true, then we
want the law to encourage third parties to aid you, and not to hinder you—after all,
your action is for the best. So prioritizing the third-party transfer principle gives us the
result that being based on true beliefs is sufficient for an action to be justified.
3.5 A Hybrid View?
Some legal theorists defend views about justification that can look more congenial to the
knowledge-first picture. Gardner (1996), for instance, argues that for an action to be
justified, there must be a match between the actual reasons in favor of an action, and the
considerations that motivated the actor to perform it.32 This looks like a view on which
justified actions must not only be best in light of the facts—as the third party transfer
principle would have it—but where there’s still some kind of requirement on the mental
state of the actor claiming the justification. A view like Gardner’s is easily able to rule
agents like Motti as unjustified—while there were excellent reasons for him to steal the
backpack, they had nothing to do with the considerations that actually motivated him.
Gardner himself doesn’t say enough about just what it takes for there to be a match
between the actual reasons and one’s motivations to make it clear whether he himself
would favor the view that justified actions must be based on knowledge.33 But regardless
of his own view on the matter, we can ask whether such a view might be motivated,
32In his terminology: “No action or belief is justified unless it is true both that there was an applicable
(guiding) reason for so acting and that this corresponded with the (explanatory) reason why the action
was performed or the belief held.”
33A reason for skepticism: he presupposes that justified beliefs can be false. In describing excused
actors, he writes the following:
The point must be that there is something suspect about the reasons for which they act.
And indeed there is. They are not valid reasons. They are what the person acting upon
them takes to be valid reasons, and justifiably so. Thus the structure of excuse derives from
the structure of justification. To excuse an action is not, of course, to justify that action.
Rather, one justifies one’s belief that the action is justified. (1996, p. 119, emphasis in
original)
Of course, this position is inconsistent with the view that justified belief is knowledge, since it presupposes
that an agent can have a justified belief that her action is justified, when in fact it is merely excused.
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given the kinds of broadly functionalist reasons for caring about the justification/excuse
distinction.
It’s far from crazy to think the legal system should treat actors like Motti differ-
ently from paradigmatically justified actors. Given the sorts of broadly future-looking
considerations emphasized in §3.3, it’s natural to think that Motti should be treated no
differently from any other thief; nothing about his conduct suggests that he’s any less
likely to steal again than a run-of-the-mill thief.
But is there room for respecting that motivation for treating Motti as unjustified—
and also unexcused—without collapsing back into the view discussed in §3.3, on which
reasonable mistake of fact is a justification? We might hold the following kind of hybrid
functional view. Justified actors should both be shielded from punitive and non-punitive
sanction, and should be aided and not hindered by third parties. So rather than priori-
tizing either of these apparently conflicting ideas, we flat out accept both positive theses,
while rejecting the negative ones. That is, if we accept this hybrid view, we won’t be
able to say that only justified actors should be shielded from punitive and non-punitive
sanctions (remember the reasonably mistaken), or that only justified actors should be
aided by third parties (remember Motti).
Whatever the merits of this view, it doesn’t mesh nicely with the position that
justified action must be based on knowledge. To see why, imagine a fictional variant of
Motti’s case. In this version, Motti is an ammunition technical officer (ATO), responding
to a bomb threat. As it turns out, the threat was a hoax—it was called in by a student
who was hoping to get his math test canceled. But the description given in the hoax call
happens to match a genuine bomb-containing backpack, which Motti finds. As Motti
moves the backpack, he doesn’t know it contains a bomb. He believes it contains a bomb,
and that belief is true, but it’s just dumb luck; Motti is in a Gettier case.
Nevertheless, it’s hard to see what reason the law could have for caring that Motti’s
“theft” isn’t based on knowledge of justifying conditions. As in the true version of the
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case, his conduct is of a sort that we hope third parties would aid, rather than hinder.
So if we prioritize the third-party transfer principle we’ll say he’s justified. Unlike in the
true version of the case, in the fictionalized version his conduct is laudable—we shouldn’t
want ATO Motti to suffer any sanctions of any sort for his behavior. So if we nevertheless
hold that his action is unjustified—we’ll presumably say it is excused—we’re left unable
to appeal to any of the standard explanations of why it matters whether we classify
defenses as justifications or excuses.
Stepping back, my strategy so far has been to look at two functional roles for the
justification/excuse distinction to play, and how prioritizing one or the other role will
motivate drawing the boundaries of justification and excuse differently in the key cases
of interest to epistemologists—cases of reasonable but false beliefs. Without taking a
stand on which, if either, we should prioritize—for all I’ve said here, we might want
to be pluralists, and/or to distinguish different species of “justification”, one of which
shields its bearer from non-punitive sanctions, and the other of which has implications
for the propriety of third party aid and hindrance—I’ve argued that neither provides
resources congenial to the knowledge-based view of justification. While there are reasons
in legal theory to distinguish between beliefs that are reasonable and beliefs that are
unreasonable, and other reasons to distinguish between beliefs that are true and beliefs
that are false, at least when it comes to justification and excuse, we haven’t seen legal
reasons to care about the distinction between beliefs that amount to knowledge, and
those that don’t.
In the next section, I’ll relax the guiding assumption I’ve been relying on, according
to which there is a tight connection between justifying belief and justifying action. I’ll
explore the prospects for vindicating a justification/excuse distinction for belief that is
merely analogous to the distinction between justified and merely excused action.
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4 Epistemic Justification as Merely Analogous to Legal
Justification
In the previous section, we saw that debates over how to classify defenses as justifica-
tions or excuses in legal theory are substantive insofar as there are further downstream
consequences—beyond immunity to punishment—that distinguish justifications from ex-
cuses. If we want to vindicate as substantive debates over whether beliefs are epistem-
ically justified or merely excused, one strategy we can pursue is to directly piggyback
on the legal theoretic strategy—assume that whether someone has a legal justification
or excuse somehow depends on whether they have an epistemic justification or excuse,
so that debates about how to distinguish epistemic justifications from excuses are auto-
matically substantive if the analogous legal debates are. That’s the strategy I’ve been
pursuing so far. The strategy I’ll explore in this section is less direct. Rather than
piggybacking on the significance of the legal distinction, I’ll ask whether we can find, in-
ternal to epistemology, something analogous to the downstream legal consequences that
distinguish justifications from excuses. That is, insofar as we agree that both epistemic
justifications and epistemic excuses shield their bearers from (some species of) blame,
I’ll look for downstream epistemological consequences that might distinguish them, so
that we’d have a vindication of the substantiveness of the epistemic justification/excuse
distinction that was parallel to, rather than derivative of, the substantiveness of the
analogous legal distinction.
While there’s a rich tradition of thinking of ethical norms as distinctive in that
their violation warrants blame, resentment, or guilt,34 and legal norms as distinctive in
that their violations warrant various varieties of legal sanction, the idea of epistemic
norms as distinguished by the sorts of reactions that their violations warrant is much
less common.35 This makes our current task harder. We’d like to have a rich array
34See, e.g., Gibbard (1990) and Darwall (2006).
35Though see Kauppinen (Forthcoming).
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of potential reactive attitudes to violations of epistemic norms to choose from, so that
we might distinguish epistemic justifications from epistemic excuses by looking to which
further reactions they block, while being similar in shielding their bearers from blame.
But that way of framing the problem is already loaded; the idea that justifications
and excuses are similar in shielding their bearers from blame seems to presuppose that,
normally, cases of norm-violation warrant blame as a reaction. In law and morality, this
is plausible, but in epistemology, it’s not obvious. The idea that violations of epistemic
norms are even prima facie blameworthy—where that default blameworthiness might
be defeated by the presence of a justification or an excuse—is controversial.36
However, there is one strand in the recent epistemological literature that may prove
helpful. A number of epistemologists have thought that an important part of the function
of epistemological concepts is that they help us identify reliable informants, (Craig,
1990). The idea, roughly, is that somebody who knows whether P—or even someone
who merely has a justified belief as to whether P, provided they have no less evidence
than you do—is somebody who you can treat as an “epistemic surrogate” (Dogramaci,
2012); she is someone whose belief on the matter you can responsibly adopt as your
own.37 This sort of picture naturally pairs with the idea that violations of epistemic
norms will defeasibly warrant withdrawals of trust or deference—when somebody forms
an unjustified belief, we should be less willing to treat them as an epistemic surrogate.38
Once we adopt this picture, we have the resources necessary to draw a justifica-
tion/excuse distinction in epistemology that parallels (one version of) the justifica-
tion/excuse distinction in legal theory. We can think of the withdrawal of deference
as analogous to the various non-punitive sanctions that are sometimes warranted in re-
36See, e.g., Feldman (2008).
37At least in the case of justification, this is controversial, as it probably depends on the assumption
of “uniqueness”: that a given body of evidence justifies a unique attitude towards any given proposition.
See Greco and Hedden (2016) and Dogramaci and Horowitz (2016) on the connection between uniqueness
on the one hand, and epistemic surrogacy on the other.
38Kauppinen (Forthcoming) defends a picture on which this is what identifies epistemic norms as
epistemic; their violation warrants withdrawal of deference.
28
Justifications and Excuses in Epistemology
sponse to merely excusable criminal actions. Just as insane actors won’t be jailed, but
may be institutionalized, merely excused believers won’t be blamed, but we may right-
fully treat them as less credible going forward. Suppose I learn that my aging mother
was taken in by an email scam—she sent a great deal of money to someone claiming to
be a Nigerian prince who needed assistance transferring funds out of the country, and
who promised to pay her back a hundredfold. Given the right background conditions—
senility, mainly—I probably won’t blame her for her belief that she was sending money
to a genuine prince.39 But, knowing that she made a mistake like this, I will take her
judgment less seriously going forward—when she says she’s found a promising investment
opportunity, I’ll be less inclined to trust, and more inclined to verify. By contrast, if she
really were justified in believing she were dealing with a prince—it’s hard to imagine the
case, but fill in the details however you need to—then not only will I not blame her, but
I won’t take her judgment any less seriously going forward.
If this is how we understand the distinction between justification and excuse in epis-
temology, then, we’ll end up vindicating the internalist response to the knowledge-first
position. Sometimes, beliefs that don’t amount to knowledge are nevertheless exactly
what you’d want a good epistemic surrogate to believe. To take the example from the
very beginning of the paper, when I learn that Lara thought she was looking at a lemon,
not only do I not blame her for this belief, but moreover I am no less inclined to trust
her judgment going forward, nor should I be. On the present proposal, that’s the mark
of epistemic justification, rather than mere excuse.
Perhaps it’s unsurprising that when we look for epistemic analogs of non-punitive
sanctions, and treat the justification/excuse distinction as significant because of its con-
sequences for whether those sanctions are warranted, we end up with a position that
parallels the view in legal theory that focuses on non-punitive sanctions, and which clas-
39That’s not to say that we would never blame somebody for such a belief. If I were to learn that my
spouse, who has no recourse to senility-based excuses, sent money from our joint account to an email
scammer, believing he was a prince, I would be justifiably angry.
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sifies reasonable mistake of fact as a justification. Can we find epistemic analogs of third
party aid/hindrance, such that an epistemic justification/excuse distinction focused on
consequences for the propriety of such aid/hindrance might support a factive, perhaps
knowledge-based conception of epistemic justification?
It’s far from clear what that might look like. In the case of action, aid and hindrance
are easy enough to understand—I aid you when I help you accomplish your aim, and I
hinder you when I make it more difficult for you to do so. What would it be for me to
aid or hinder you in your belief, such that we might then understand justifications as
differing from excuses in terms of their consequences concerning when third parties can
aid or hinder you in your beliefs? While it’s a bit of a stretch, one way we might interpret
“hindrance” as applied to belief involves persuasion; I could “hinder” you in some belief
of yours by trying to disabuse you of it. And I can “aid” you in a belief of yours merely
in not trying to disabuse you of it. If this is how we think of aid and hindrance, and
we hold that justified beliefs are ones that third parties should aid/shouldn’t hindered,
then I suggest we’ll end up with a position analogous to the position discussed in §3.4,
on which truth is necessary and sufficient for a belief to be justified. That is, suppose I
am a third party who knows that you have a reasonable but mistaken belief. Perhaps
you’re Lara, and I’m someone who already tried to take a bite of the wax lemon, and so
who knows it’s a fake. Here, the fact that your belief is reasonable shouldn’t prevent me
from trying to disabuse you of it—from trying to save you from my waxy fate. So this
framing will lead us towards thinking of reasonable but false beliefs as merely excused.
But, for similar reasons to the ones we saw in §3.4, it won’t get us all the way to
requiring knowledge for justification. Suppose you believe, but do not know, that one
of the pieces of fruit in the bowl is wax. Maybe you’re inclined towards paranoia, and
tend to suspect that all food you’re offered is somehow tainted. While it would be fine
for me to try to disabuse you of that general belief, it would be perverse for me to try to
convince you to give up the specific application to the case of the fruit in front of you.
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Rather, the more appropriate response would involve conceding that you happened to
get things right this time—the lemon really is wax—while insisting that it really was
just luck, and that this wasn’t something you should have expected ex ante. That is,
if we look for epistemological analogs of aid/hindrance, and hold that justified beliefs
should be aided while merely excused beliefs shouldn’t, then the natural thing to say
seems to be that we should aid true beliefs and hinder false ones, without regards to
whether they are reasonably or knowledgeably held.
5 Conclusions
My aim in this paper was to explore prospects for breaking an apparent deadlock. In-
ternalists say that reasonable false beliefs are justified, knowledge firsters say they are
merely excused. But there’s enough background agreement—e.g., on the fact that false
beliefs are somehow defective, and that reasonable false beliefs are somehow better than
delusional beliefs—that it’s not entirely clear just what turns on whether reasonable false
beliefs should get the honorific “justified” or not. Following the methodological lesson of
Chalmers (2011), my strategy was to look for some of the theoretical roles that we might
care to pick out with “justification” and “excuse,” and to then ask what sorts of prop-
erties of beliefs might be apt to play those roles. In the legal literature on justifications
and excuses, I found one pair of roles for which the internalist conception of justification
fits the bill—the role of shielding someone from both punitive and non-punitive sanc-
tions, as contrasted with the role of shielding someone merely from punitive sanctions.
I also found a pair of roles for which a truth-based conception of justification fits the
bill—the role of both shielding someone from punishment and shielding third-parties
who aid her from punishment, versus the role of doing only the former. But I found no
roles for “justification” and “excuse” that mesh with the view that justification just is
knowledge.
31
Justifications and Excuses in Epistemology
A narrow conclusion we can draw is that the legal theoretic literature on justifications
and excuses provides little aid and comfort to the knowledge-firster, and is more congenial
to both the traditional internalist and the proponent of the less common view that
justified beliefs are just true beliefs. But I think a broader conclusion can be drawn as
well. In “A Plea for Excuses”, Austin (1956) appeals to a kind of conceptual conservatism
in defense of ordinary language philosophy:
Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found
worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the
lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous,
more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the
fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical
matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our armchairs of an
afternoon—the most favoured alternative method.
This sort of argument is often offered in favor of knowledge-first epistemology.40
“Knows” is a piece of ordinary language in a way that “reasonably believes”, “believes
with high probability”, and “truly believes” are not.41 However, it’s possible to offer
a defense of the categories used in the common law that parallels Austin’s defense of
ordinary language. They embody all the distinctions judges and lawyers have found
worth drawing and the connections they’ve found worth making across a body of case
law that spans generations. And if the general thrust of this paper has been correct, then
it’s telling that—at least when it comes to justifying and excusing actions—while jurists
have found reason to mark the distinction between reasonable belief and unreasonable
belief, as well as the distinction between truth and falsity, the distinction between knowl-
edge and ignorance has had no crucial role to play. The idea that some assortment of
replacement concepts can do the work of knowledge, when proposed by a philosopher
40See, e.g., Stanley (2005, p. vi-vii).
41See, e.g., Nagel (2014, p.6).
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on the basis of an afternoon’s thought, is apt to be less than persuasive. But when the
proposal is based on the fact that these replacement concepts are already doing that
work in our courtrooms, and have been for generations, then it should carry a good deal
more weight. So in addition to my narrow conclusion, my broader aim in this paper
has been to put a dent in the conceptual conservatism based case for knowledge-first
epistemology.
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